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According to what is becoming known as the legal restric-
tions theory, both the potential level of nominal interest 
rates and the potential effectiveness of open market 
operations are closely linked to government rules that 
prevent private currency-issue—that is, that prevent pri-
vate financial intermediaries from issuing liabilities that, 
like currency, are in small and standard denominations 
and are payable to the bearer. Without such legal re-
strictions, the theory says, an upper bound on nominal in-
terest rates would be implied by the standard equilibrium 
condition that arbitrage between government currency and 
interest-bearing securities not be profitable. One form that 
such arbitrage could take, if it were allowed, is the buying 
of interest-bearing, nominally default-free securities and 
the selling of small-denomination notes which promised to 
pay the bearer government currency when the purchased 
securities matured. If the public would accept such 
backed, dated privately issued notes as perfect substitutes 
for government currency (so that the former would not 
bear interest if the latter did not), then the no-profit 
condition implies that the costs of engaging in such in-
termediation would set an upper bound on nominal in-
terest rates.
1 If, moreover, those costs were the same for 
the central bank as for private firms, then open market 
operations would not affect the total amount of currency, 
government and private, or anything else.
2 
Most would agree that the most questionable of the 
assumptions behind these conclusions is that the public 
would accept backed, dated currency-like notes offered by 
private firms as perfect substitutes for government curren-
cy. That the public would do this is perhaps not obvious, 
considering what are often described as past unhappy 
experiences with private forms of currency. We will not 
review that historical evidence here. Instead, we will 
describe some fairly recent evidence on which we have 
stumbled: reports of two experiences with a form of private 
currency in Canada. The form of currency is a bit 
unorthodox: coupons issued by retail businesses. The form 
of evidence is unorthodox, too: primarily anecdotes, 
reported in newspapers. However, these anecdotes can be 
instructive. They seem to suggest that it would be unwise 
to reject the legal restrictions theory because of a belief that 
the public would reject privately issued currency. 
Coupon-Issuing as Intermediation 
The merchant coupons we will describe are somewhat 
different from most coupons. They are denominated in 
Canadian dollars, in small and standard sizes, and can be 
used at any time at their face value to buy any goods 
offered for sale by the issuing merchants. The coupons are 
given to customers as a discount on their purchases. 
These merchant coupons are also somewhat different 
from the private currency described above. Instead of 
being claims to government currency at some time in the 
1 Casual evidence concerning the costs of operating other kinds of financial 
intermediaries and the costs of issuing and maintaining government currency 
suggests that the upper bound would be about 1 percent per year or less. 
2 For a more complete description of this theory and its implications, see 
Wallace 1983. 
2 Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Quarterly Review/Winter 1985 
future, the coupons are claims to a dollar value of a limited 
set of goods (the merchant's) at any time. The at-any-time, 
or on-demand, feature of the coupons would seem to work 
in their favor as potential substitutes for government 
currency. But their explicit restriction to only particular 
goods would seem to work against them. Thus, expe-
riences with these coupons are not ideal experiments for 
judging public acceptance of dated private notes backed 
by default-free securities. The experiences should, never-
theless, provide some hints. 
Moreover, the experiences with merchant coupons are 
worth attention because these coupons are like dated, 
backed private notes in a crucial way: their issue is a form 
of intermediation between government currency and in-
terest-bearing assets. This similarity may not be immedi-
ately apparent, but it can be seen by considering what the 
no-profit condition implies for a merchant coupon scheme. 
If a merchant's customers expected that the coupons 
would circulate at face value, then sales of goods would 
depend on net prices—gross prices minus the discount in 
coupons. In such circumstances, the profit per period from 
operating a coupon scheme would equal the interest the 
merchant could earn on the amount of the discount not yet 
claimed (the nominal interest rate times the average vol-
ume of coupons outstanding) minus the costs of oper-
ating the scheme. Thus, the equilibrium condition that it 
not be profitable to expand such coupon schemes implies 
that the costs of operating them would determine an upper 
bound on nominal interest rates, a familiar conclusion. 
Also familiar is the most controversial assumption behind 
it: that the public would accept the privately issued sub-
stitute for government currency—here, merchant cou-
pons—at face value. 
A Short-Lived Coupon Scheme ... 
One of our two Canadian coupon experiences lasted only 
three months, but not because the public wouldn't accept 
the coupons. On March 2,1983, Steinberg, Inc., the third-
largest supermarket chain in Quebec, introduced an 
across-the-board 5 percent rebate payable to all customers 
in coupons. The immediate result was a price war among 
supermarkets. On March 4,1983, Provigo, Inc., Quebec's 
largest food chain, reacted by simply reducing all prices 6 
percent Metro-Richelieu, Inc., the second-largest chain, 
matched Steinberg's 5 percent discount by stamping cash 
register receipts and offering 5 percent of the total as a 
discount on future purchases. Because of large losses, 
Steinberg's announced on June 1,1983, that it was ending 
the 5 percent discount and the issue of coupons. It would, 
however, honor all existing coupons. 
For our purposes, we would like to know whether 
Steinberg coupons were used at face value for any 
transactions beyond Steinberg's—to pay a taxi driver or 
buy a newspaper, for example. As one might imagine, 
determining this is not easy, and unfortunately, we can 
offer no hard evidence. The best we can do is quote at 
length from a newspaper story (Bryan 1983b) which 
suggests that at least in their first month these coupons had 
begun to be traded at face value in a significant number of 
Canadian stores; in other words, they had begun to be 
treated somewhat like a privately issued currency. 
The coupon "money" that the Steinberg supermarket 
chain introduced this month is being spent in record stores, 
drugstores and at least one competing food chain, as other 
retailers try to piggyback on the widely-advertised promo-
tional scheme. 
"A Steinberg coupon is cash. I have absolutely no qualms 
about it," said Irving Heisler, president of the Discus chain 
of 50 record stores. 
Heisler began accepting the coupon money a few days 
after Steinberg Inc. brought it out March 2, and now has "a 
couple thousand dollars" worth stuffed into filing-cabinet 
drawers at his company's St. Laurent headquarters. 
The A & P food chain, with 15 Quebec supermarkets, 
and Kane's Super Drug marts, with two Montreal stores, 
have followed. 
All three calculate that by accepting Steinberg money, 
they will attract at least a few customers who wouldn't other-
wise have come in. . . . 
Discus, which is the only one of the three to have more 
than a week's experience with the coupon money, believes 
the move was a success. "It looks like we'll take them 
forever," said Heisler. 
A & P hopes not only to bring in new shoppers, but also to 
reduce the number of its own customers who might make 
purchases at Steinberg and then feel they should keep going 
back so as not to waste the coupon money. 
... And Quite a Long One 
Our other Canadian coupon experience lasted much 
longer than Steinberg's. In fact, the Canadian Tire 
Corporation Limited is still operating a coupon system 
which it began in 1958. The Toronto-based firm has 354 
retail outlets sprinkled all over Canada. These outlets sell 
primarily gasoline, but also hardware and sporting goods. 
Although the precise details of the system differ from 
province to province, in Quebec customers receive a 4 
3 percent rebate payable in small-denomination coupons.
3 
According to Canadian Tire, the face value of the average 
stock of the coupons outstanding in 1982 was approxi-
mately 20 million Canadian dollars. 
The age of this coupon scheme and its volume of 
coupons may alone suggest that the public is accepting 
Canadian Tire coupons as currency in at least a limited 
way. However, systematic evidence about how generally 
the coupons trade at face value is no easier to find for them 
than for Steinberg's short-lived coupons. 
One little bit of evidence on the general acceptance of 
Canadian Tire coupons comes from Andre Dion, execu-
tive vice president and director general of Le Groupe Ro-
Na Inc., a large Quebec chain of hardware, renovation, 
sports, and garment stores which competes with Canadian 
Tire. He reportedly told a newspaper (Canadian Tire..., 
1983) that a company survey indicated that "80% to 82% 
of the people have Canadian Tire money." According to 
Dion, that survey prompted Ro-Na to start its own coupon 
scheme and to accept Canadian Tire coupons at face value 
"for at least two months and perhaps longer." 
One final newspaper story (Tory MP ..., 1983) sug-
gests that Canadian Tire coupons are being used gen-
erally: 
It seems that Sinclair Stevens is often kidded by colleagues 
for being tight with a buck. But they say that frugality paid off 
for the one-time Treasury Board chairman when he hopped 
into a cab for a trip to the airport and found he had no cash 
when he reached his destination. 
Embarrassing for a millionaire? No problem for Sine. 
"You take Canadian Tire coupons?" he asked the driver. 
"Why not?" replied the cabbie. 
Whereupon Stevens reached into a hoard of merchandise 
coupons he'd saved in his briefcase, and cheerfully paid off in 
funny money. 
Concluding Remarks 
These Canadian experiences with coupons issued by 
merchants demonstrate how privately issued currency can 
be created and come to be widely used They lend some 
support to the view that, given the chance, the public would 
accept backed, privately issued currency as a perfect 
substitute for government currency. Although the avail-
able evidence is entirely anecdotal, that these Canadian 
experiences provide even a shred of evidence is remark-
able because a Canadian law explicitly prohibits privately 
issued currency.
4 This law is likely responsible for limiting 
the medium-of-exchange role of coupons in Canada. The 
law not only prevents coupon-issuers from touting their 
product as an alternative currency; it also encourages 
issuers to act to inhibit the general use of their coupons. 
Canadian Tire recently acted in this way, for example, 
when it sought an injunction to prevent a rival company 
from accepting Canadian Tire coupons.
5 In the face of 
such actions, our anecdotal evidence is more impressive 
than it may otherwise appear. 
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